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INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF A FATEFUL TRIP
Six people embarked on a three-hour tour of Louisiana’s territorial
waters in the M.V. Minnow, including a first mate named Gilligan, a
millionaire couple, a movie star, a farm girl, and a science professor.1 The
vessel’s steering system malfunctioned in a storm, causing the vessel to
wreck onto a deserted island. After months on the island, the Coast Guard
finally rescued the shipwrecked castaways. Upon being informed of their
legal rights, the six castaways brought negligence claims against the
manufacturer of the M.V. Minnow’s steering system.2
At trial, the parties proved that the manufacturer knew of a defect that
could cause the steering to fail suddenly and lead to catastrophic
consequences. Despite this knowledge, the manufacturer neither fixed the
steering system nor warned vessel operators of this potential hazard. After
making these factual findings and applying general maritime products
liability law, the jury concluded that the manufacturer acted willfully and
Copyright 2018, by SARA B. KUEBEL.
1. Facts and characters of this introductory hypothetical are loosely based
on Gilligan’s Island. See Gilligan’s Island (CBS television broadcast Sept. 1964).
This Comment leaves out the Skipper because his ownership of the vessel could
complicate the issue presented. As a vessel owner, the Skipper could be liable to
Gilligan for breaching the duty of unseaworthiness. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960). Moreover, Skipper owes a duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances to the other passengers. Kermerac v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959).
2. Facts and causes of action are loosely based on a Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal case. See Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 196 So. 3d 776 (La.
Ct. App. 2016).
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wantonly in failing to warn vessel operators of the danger. Accordingly,
the court awarded the castaways compensatory and punitive damages
against the manufacturer. Not all of the castaways recovered the punitive
damages awarded, however.
Under the reasoning of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Scarborough v. Clemco Industries, Gilligan would not be able
to recover punitive damages from the third-party manufacturer because he
was a member of the crew of the M.V. Minnow.3 However, the nonseafarers—the millionaire couple, the movie star, the farm girl, and the
science professor—all may be able to recover maritime law punitive
damages from the third-party tortfeasor. Gilligan’s employment connection
to the M.V. Minnow precludes his recovery of punitive damages from the
manufacturer despite the fact that he suffered from the same injuries caused
by the same tortious misconduct.
Absent a controlling congressional statute, maritime law should not
treat seamen any differently in their remedies against a third-party nonemployer. This anomaly restricts the remedies of seamen and shields the
third-party tortfeasor from accountability to all victims of its wrongful
conduct. Relying on United States Supreme Court cases adjudicated
subsequent to Scarborough,4 courts within the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals remain divided on whether seamen may recover punitive damages
against third-party tortfeasors.5 In the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, several judges have held, relying on
Scarborough, that seamen cannot recover punitive damages from a third
party.6 One judge within the same district has disagreed, however, relying
on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Sounding Co.,
Inc. v. Townsend.7 After revisiting Scarborough in light of the Court’s

3. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 66768 (5th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005).
4. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009); Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); see also Scarborough, 391 F.3d 660.
5. See Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL
5254710 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015) (Fallon, J.); Hume v. Consol. Grain & Barge,
Inc., No. 15-0935, 2016 WL 1089349 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2016) (Zainey, J.). But
see Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, L.L.C., No. 13-4811, 2015 WL 7428581 (E.D.
La. Nov. 20, 2015) (Morgan, J.); Wade v. Clemco Indus. Corp., No. 16-502, 2017
WL 434425 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2017) (Fallon, J.).
6. See Howard, 2015 WL 7428581; see also Scarborough, 391 F.3d 660.
7. See Collins, 2015 WL 5254710, at *34; Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at
*2 (Fallon, J.) (arguing that the subsequent Supreme Court decision “effectively
overruled” the Fifth Circuit precedent); see also Townsend, 557 U.S. 404. But see
Wade, 2017 WL 434425 (demonstrating Judge Fallon changing course and
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reasoning in Townsend, the en banc Fifth Circuit should reverse
Scarborough and permit both seamen and non-seamen to recover punitive
damages under general maritime law.
Part I of this Comment gives a brief overview of admiralty jurisdiction
as well as the scope of maritime law. This Part also explains the sources
of maritime law, its general principle of uniformity, and the remedies
available to seamen. Part II analyzes the chronology of cases addressing
maritime punitive damages. Additionally, Part II illustrates the split in the
Eastern District of Louisiana concerning whether a Jones Act seaman may
recover punitive damages from a third-party non-employer. Part III of this
Comment argues that punitive damages remain available under general
maritime law and that these damages are available to a Jones Act seaman
against a third-party non-employer. To best achieve uniformity in
maritime law, this Comment proposes that the law should afford seamen
and non-seafarers the same protections under general maritime law against
non-employers; to do otherwise would drown all hopes of protecting
seamen as the “wards of admiralty.”8
I. A THREE-HOUR TOUR THROUGH ADMIRALTY LAW
Over the past several centuries, maritime law has developed into an
expansive body of rules and principles covering a vast sea of parties and
occurrences. Preliminarily, courts must determine whether the cause of
action invokes admiralty jurisdiction. Once established, the court then
must consider which of the various theories of liability the plaintiff may
pursue. Finally, if the court finds the defendant liable, it must decide what
types of damages the plaintiff may recover.
A. The Scope of Admiralty Jurisdiction
Pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution,
“The judicial power shall extend . . . to all [c]ases of admiralty and
finding that Jones Act seamen cannot recover punitive damages and Scarborough
remains good law).
8. See Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. 611, 620 (1827) (Johnson, J., concurring)
(referring to seamen for the first time as the “wards of . . . Admiralty”). Many later
cases followed Ramsay’s use of this terminology. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275, 286 (1897); Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co., 211 U.S. 239, 247
(1908); see also Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 162 (1934) (“In respect of dealings
of that order, the maritime law by inveterate tradition has made the ordinary seaman
a member of a favored class. He is a ‘ward of the admiralty,’ often ignorant and
helpless, and so in need of protection against himself as well as others.”).
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maritime [j]urisdiction.”9 Moreover, the Constitution also grants Congress
the power “[t]o make all [l]aws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into [e]xecution the foregoing [p]owers and all other [p]owers
vested by this Constitution in the [g]overnment of the United States or in
any [d]epartment or [o]fficer thereof.”10 Although Congress possesses the
“paramount power” to determine maritime law,11 if no controlling
congressional statute applies, general maritime law as developed by
federal courts governs admiralty.12 Relying on state and federal sources,
general maritime law mixes traditional common law rules, modifies those
rules, and creates new maritime principles.13 Therefore, general maritime
law, also known as federal maritime law, as developed by the judiciary,
coexists with and complements the statutory maritime law set and fixed
by Congress.
American maritime law draws its principles from three sources:
federal statutes; federal common law; and, occasionally, state law.14
Courts consistently emphasize that “the Constitution must have referred to
a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole
country”15 when it granted original jurisdiction to all cases of admiralty

9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress subsequently reinforced federal
maritime jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012), which states, “The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . .
[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.”
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
11. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (“[I]t must now be
accepted as settled doctrine that, in consequence of these provisions, Congress
has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country.”).
12. Id. (“[I]n the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime
law, as accepted by the [f]ederal courts, constitutes part of our national law,
applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”).
13. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
86465 (1986) (“[T]he general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional commonlaw rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.”).
14. See Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. State law only applies in certain situations.
As stated by the Supreme Court, “no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to
the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate
relations.” Id.; see also Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
15. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874).
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and maritime law to federal courts.16 This uniformity principle guides
courts and Congress to develop a consistent body of rules throughout the
entire United States17 for causes of action invoking admiralty
jurisdiction.18 Uniformity provides practical consistency and predictability
for actors engaged in maritime commerce throughout the United States. If
the plaintiff’s case falls within the purview of maritime jurisdiction, he
may pursue various causes of action.
B. The Sea of Remedies Available to Jones Act Seamen
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones
Act, does not define “seaman” in its statutory language,19 but the Supreme
Court has created a two-part test for such a determination.20 The seaman
must “contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of
its mission,”21 and the seaman must have a substantial connection both in
16. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Union Fish
Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375 (1970).
17. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. at 575.
18. Admiralty jurisdiction arises through congressional grants of jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Death on the High Seas Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 30301–30308; Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101;
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950.
Admiralty jurisdiction also arises under general maritime law. See Exec. Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). Jurisdiction over a tort
requires “locality” and a determination of whether the tort possesses a substantial
relationship to traditional maritime activity and the potential to disrupt maritime
commerce. See The Plymouth, 70 U.S. 20, 34–35 (1865) (explaining admiralty
jurisdiction and locality by stating that “[t]his class of cases may well be referred
to as illustrating the true meaning of the rule of locality in cases of marine torts,
namely, that the wrong and injury complained of must have been committed
wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters.”); see also Sisson v. Ruby, 497
U.S. 358, 362 (1990) (citing Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674–
75 (1982)) (establishing the two-part test of admiralty jurisdiction).
19. See § 30104; see also Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438,
441 (2001) (“A Jones Act claim is an in personam action for a seaman who suffers
injury in the course of employment due to negligence of his employer, the vessel
owner, or crew members.”).
20. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995).
21. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991) (“The key to
seaman status is employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation . . . [W]e
believe the requirement that an employee’s duties must ‘contribute to the function of
the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission’ captures well an important
requirement of seaman status. It is not necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or
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time and nature to the vessel in navigation.22 Jones Act seamen may
recover damages from their employer under multiple theories of liabilities:
maintenance and cure; unseaworthiness; and negligence under the Jones
Act, among others. General maritime law also provides a vast sea of
remedies for Jones Act seamen to pursue against third parties.23 The
identity of the defendant determines the causes of action a seaman may
pursue.24
1. The Seaman’s General Maritime Claim Against the Employer or
the Vessel Owner
Before the enactment of the Jones Act, seamen could recover damages
against their employer based on two causes of action.25 Seamen could
bring a claim for maintenance and cure against their employer or a claim
for damages resulting from the unseaworthiness of the vessel against the
vessel owner.26 Both claims would arise under general maritime law.27

contribute to the transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must be doing the ship’s
work.” (quoting Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959))).
22. Latsis, 515 U.S. at 368. See Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S.
548, 557 (1997) (discussing that determination of an identifiable group of vessels
turns on whether the vessels are under common ownership or control).
23. Latsis, 515 U.S. at 354.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). The Court in this case stated,
Upon a full review, however, of English and American authorities upon
these questions, we think the law may be considered as settled upon the
following propositions: 1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in
case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the
extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as
the voyage is continued. 2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by
English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received
by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure
to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.
3. That all the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover
for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the
crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and cure. 4. That the
seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the
master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident.
Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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a. Maintenance and Cure
Dating back to the 13th century, courts have recognized that “the
vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded,
in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to
his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.”28 The seaman’s
claim for maintenance and cure exists independently of his claims for
negligence or unseaworthiness.29 Once the seaman has been injured, the
obligation to pay maintenance and cure benefits arises immediately and
does not require a finding of negligence or fault.30 Maritime law has long
recognized that the vessel owner or employer owes a duty of “maintenance
and cure,” and courts liberally interpret this duty to protect seamen’s
rights.31 Moreover, the Supreme Court affirmed an award of punitive
damages against an employer for the willful and wanton refusal to pay
maintenance and cure to an injured seaman in the recent case of
Townsend.32
b. Unseaworthiness of the Vessel
Unseaworthiness is a theory of recovery based on a vessel owner’s nondelegable duty to ensure that the vessel, its crew, and its appurtenances are

28. Id. See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001)
(“A claim for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to
provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the
ship.”); Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 3 (1975); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369
U.S. 527, 532 (1962). The remedy entitles a seaman to maintenance and cure until
he reaches maximum cure or the point at which medical science can no longer
improve the seaman’s condition. Vaughan, 369 U.S at 538.
29. See Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527 (1938) (“The duty,
which arises from the contract of employment, . . . does not rest upon negligence
or culpability on the part of the owner or master.”).
30. Id.
31. See Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531–32; see also Harden v. Gordon, C.C., 11
F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (involving a crew member’s claim for wages
earned and sick expenses). In Harden, Justice Story remarked that “[e]very court
should watch with jealousy an encroachment upon the rights of seamen, because
they are unprotected and need counsel . . . . But courts of maritime law have been
in the constant habit of extending towards them a peculiar, protecting favor and
guardianship. They are emphatically the wards of the admiralty.” Harden, 11 F.
Cas at 485.
32. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
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reasonably fit for their intended use.33 Furthermore, “the vessel and her
owner are . . . liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in
consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and
keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.”34 The cause
of action does not require that the vessel owner have knowledge of the
unseaworthy condition.35 The vessel need not be maintained in perfect
condition; rather, it only must be reasonably fit for its intended purpose.36
To date, the Supreme Court has not considered whether a general
maritime law claim for unseaworthiness may result in an award of punitive
damages.37 A divided Fifth Circuit sitting en banc, however, decided that
such damages remain unavailable in the seaman’s claim against the Jones
Act employer.38 Nonetheless, damages for unseaworthiness may be
pursued against only the employer or the vessel owner to which the
seaman was assigned, not from third parties.39 Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s en
banc McBride v. Estis Well Services, L.L.C. decision does not apply to a
seaman’s general maritime law tort claim against third parties, who are
neither employers nor vessel owners. With the growth of maritime
commerce, Congress, in 1920, expanded the remedies available to those
exposed to the “perils of the sea.”40
2. The Seaman’s Jones Act Negligence Claim
The Jones Act expanded the remedies available to a seaman.41 The
Jones Act effectively overruled a portion of the Supreme Court’s prior
decision in The Osceola42 by granting seamen a cause of action for
33. See Colon v. Trinidad Corp., 188 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Vargas v.
McNamara, 608 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1979).
34. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
35. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549 (1960).
36. See id. at 550 (“The standard is not perfections, but reasonable fitness; not
a ship that will weather every conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril
of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service.”).
37. See Wade v. Clemco Indus. Corp., No. 16-502, 2017 WL 434425, at *4–
6 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2017) (discussing punitive damage cases addressed by the
Supreme Court in recent years).
38. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014) (en
banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
39. See Bridges v. Penrod Drilling, 740 F.2d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1984).
40. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995).
41. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009).
42. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The Court in this case stated,
Upon a full review, however, of English and American authorities upon
these questions, we think the law may be considered as settled upon the
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negligence against their employer.43 The remedy requires the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between the seaman and the Jones Act
employer.44 The Jones Act did not eliminate other maritime causes of
action or create a mutually exclusive right; it simply created a statutory
right for the seaman to sue the employer for damages resulting from its
negligence.45 Twelve years before passing the Jones Act, Congress created
an identical negligence cause of action in the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (“FELA”) for railway workers against their employers.46 The Jones
Act incorporated FELA by reference; therefore, cases interpreting FELA
also apply to the Jones Act. 47

following propositions: 1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in
case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the service of the ship, to the
extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his wages, at least so long as
the voyage is continued. 2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by
English and American law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received
by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure
to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship.
3. That all the members of the crew, except, perhaps, the master, are, as
between themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover
for injuries sustained through the negligence of another member of the
crew beyond the expense of his maintenance and cure. 4. That the
seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the
master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and
cure, whether the injuries were received by negligence or accident.
Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
43. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012) (“A seaman injured in the course of
employment or, if the seaman dies from the injury, the personal representative of
the seaman may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury,
against the employer. Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal
injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”).
44. See Volyrakis v. M/V Isabella, 668 F.2d 863, 865–66 (5th Cir. 1982).
45. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 416. See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498
U.S. 337, 342 (1991).
46. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (“Every common carrier by railroad while engaging
in commerce . . . shall be liable in damage to any person suffering injury while he
is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or in the case of the death of such
employee, to his or her personal representative . . . for such injury or death
resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier, or by reasons of any defect or insufficiency, due to its
negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works,
boats, wharves, or other equipment.”).
47. See § 30104 (“Laws of the United States regulating recovery for personal
injury to, or death of, a railway employee apply to an action under this section.”).
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Courts consistently hold that the Jones Act does not allow an award of
punitive damages to the Jones Act seaman.48 The Jones Act, however,
applies only to a claim by a Jones Act seaman against his employer and
“Congress has not addressed the issue of non-employer liability.”49 A
claim by an injured plaintiff, who happens to be a seaman, against a nonemployer does not implicate the Jones Act and should not trigger its
limitation on damages.50 The claim against the non-employer arises not
from a seaman’s status, but rather pursuant to general maritime law tort
principles.
3. Causes of Action Available to Seamen Against Third Parties
In addition to the causes of action available to seamen against
employers and vessel owners, general maritime law has long recognized
various causes of action for maritime torts.51 As long as the tort meets the
test for admiralty jurisdiction,52 the plaintiff may pursue a claim.53 Seamen
have various remedies at their disposal if they become injured.54 Not only
may they sue for claims arising from seaman status, but they also may sue
any third party committing a tort cognizable by general maritime law or

48. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (discussing the
history behind FELA and its pecuniary limitation); see also Bergen v. F/V St.
Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion modified on reh’g, 866 F.2d
318 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Punitive damages are non-pecuniary damages unavailable
under the Jones Act.”); Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457
(6th Cir. 1993) (“It has been the unanimous judgment of the courts since before
the enactment of the Jones Act that punitive damages are not recoverable under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. Punitive damages are not therefore
recoverable under the Jones Act.”).
49. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 667 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005).
50. See Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL
5254710, at *4–5 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015).
51. See Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (Story, J.)
(“The admiralty has not, and never (I believe) deliberately claimed to have any
jurisdiction over torts, except such as are maritime torts, that is, such as are
committed on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.”).
52. See supra note 18.
53. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625, 630 (1959) (holding that a shipowner owes a duty of reasonable care towards
persons lawfully aboard the vessel); E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986) (holding that general maritime law incorporated
products liability law into its general principles).
54. See supra Part I.B.
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any applicable state law for a land-based injury.55 Nevertheless, a
substantial debate has surfaced in maritime law regarding the remedies
available in these various causes of action.
C. The Weather Started Getting Rough: Punitive Damages in Maritime
Law
Punitive damages are defined as “damages assessed by way of
penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others.”56 They operate
as “private fines” intended to punish the defendant for reckless disregard
for the safety of others or willful and wanton misconduct.57 United States
common law established the doctrine of punitive damages in its early
history,58 but admiralty law suffers from a long and complicated
relationship with punitive damages both before the passage of the Jones
Act and thereafter.
1. Pre-Jones Act Punitive Damages
Plaintiffs can recover punitive damages under common-law
principles;59 admiralty courts, however, did not clearly articulate and
decide whether punitive damages were available in maritime law.60 In
early 19th century cases, the Supreme Court referenced a judge’s ability
to award “vindictive” or “exemplary” damages.61 In an 1818 case
involving the plundering of a vessel, The Amiable Nancy, Justice Story
noted that if the plaintiffs had brought the suit against the original
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of . . . [a]ny civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled.”).
56. See Punitive Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
57. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool, 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
58. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
59. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409–10 (2009).
60. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law,
28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73 passim (1997) (discussing historical maritime cases
awarding punitive damages).
61. See The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 passim (1818) (discussing
exemplary and vindictive damages against the original wrongdoers for the
robbery and plundering of a vessel); see also La Amistad De Rues, 18 U.S. 385
passim (1820) (referring to exemplary damages in a prize case); The Apollon, 22
U.S. 362, 374 (1824) (considering the possibility of vindictive damages in a vessel
seizure case); The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1827) (reviewing the possibility of
vindictive damages in a prize case).
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wrongdoers and not the shipowner, “proper punishment” consisting of
exemplary damages would be warranted for such reprehensible
misconduct.62 Likewise, lower federal courts discussed the possibility of
exemplary and vindictive damages in the maritime tort context.63
Furthermore, in the 1893 case of Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v.
Prentice,64 while discussing the availability of punitive or vindictive
damages, the Supreme Court found that admiralty cases rely on the same
common-law principles for awarding punitive damages.65 Although most
early cases discussing exemplary or vindictive damages did not actually
award damages against the defendant, “that fact does not draw into
question the basic understanding that punitive damages were considered
an available maritime remedy.”66 Notwithstanding this early history,
starting in the 20th century, Congress began to legislate comprehensively
in the area of maritime law; consequently, seamen no longer needed to rely
on common law and the federal courts to grant relief.67 Because statutory
maritime law preempts general maritime law,68 many admiralty courts
now look first to statutory maritime law, such as the Jones Act, as guidance
for determining damage awards for seamen, including punitive damages.69

62. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. at 558.
63. See McGuire v. The Golden Gate, 16 F. Cas. 141, 143 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1856)
(“In an action against the perpetrator of the wrong, the aggrieved party would be
entitled to recover not only actual damages but exemplary, such as would vindicate
his wrongs, and teach the tort feasor the necessity of reform.”); see also Ralston v. The
State Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201, 209 (D.C. E.D. Pa. 1836) (“The damages which are called
‘exemplary’ are nothing more than a high and exaggerated estimate of the wrong or
injury, which courts and juries take upon themselves to allow, bringing into
calculation . . . something beyond the mere pecuniary loss or personal suffering.”);
Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas. 957, 957 (C.C. Mass. 1820) (“In cases of marine
torts, or illegal captures, it is far from being uncommon in the admiralty to allow costs
and expences [sic], and to mulct the offending parties, even in exemplary damages,
where the nature of the case requires it.”).
64. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
65. Id. at 108 (“[C]ourts of admiralty . . . proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same
principles as courts of common law, in allowing exemplary damages . . . for expenses
incurred, or injuries or losses sustained, by the misconduct of the other party.”).
66. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 412 n.2 (2009).
67. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990).
68. See supra note 11.
69. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31–32.
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2. Post-Jones Act Punitive Damages
After the passage of the Jones Act and other statutory maritime law,70
the inquiry before the courts began to shift as to whether such laws
displaced general maritime law recovery available to seamen. Because
Congress passed piecemeal rather than comprehensive statutes,71 courts
and judges were left to navigate through the unchartered waters of
recovery and liability.
a. Taking Wind out of the Sails: From Loss of Society Damages to
Punitive Damages
Several key cases from the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court initiated
a trend of restricting a seaman’s recovery of certain damages, including
loss of society72 and other non-pecuniary damages.73 Courts then classified
punitive damages as non-pecuniary damages and disallowed the recovery
of such awards.74 These cases, whose subject matter ranged from wrongful
death to unseaworthiness to Jones Act negligence, explored the interplay
between general maritime law recovery and the preclusive effect of
statutory maritime law.75 This trend led some scholars to predict that
seamen might no longer be able to recover punitive damages, but the
Supreme Court rocked the boat in 2008 and 2009.76

70. See, e.g., Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2012); Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30302; Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101; Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903.
71. See Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (not mentioning the type of damages
recover under the Act). But see Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30302
(identifying only pecuniary damages as recoverable under the Act).
72. Loss of society is equivalent to the Louisiana concept of loss of
consortium. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law:
Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. REV. 463, 464–65 (2010), for a discussion
of pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages.
73. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
74. See infra Part I.C.2.a.ii.
75. See infra Part I.C.
76. See infra Part I.C.2.c–d; see also David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in
American Maritime Law, supra note 60, at 163 (“Punitive damages are thus rapidly
disappearing from maritime personal injury law.”). But see Robertson, Punitive
Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 72, at 463
(“In 1997 I wrote that ‘[p]unitive damages are . . . rapidly disappearing from maritime
personal injury law.’ It turns out this was a premature obituary.”).
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i. The Rising Tides of Denied Recovery: From DOHSA and
Higginbotham to the Jones Act and Miles
Several key wrongful death cases decided both before and after the
passage of the Jones Act began to slowly limit the recoveries available to
seamen, culminating with Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham.77 In 1978, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited issue of whether the
widows of passengers killed in a helicopter crash outside Louisiana’s
territorial waters could recover loss of society damages.78 In
Higginbotham, the Court needed to decide “which measure of damages to
apply in a death action arising on the high seas—the rule chosen by
Congress in 1920 [in the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”)79] or
the rule chosen by this Court in Gaudet.”80 Ignoring policy arguments, the
Higginbotham Court noted that “Congress has struck the balance for us. It
has limited survivors to recovery of their pecuniary losses.”81
The Court recognized the need for uniformity in maritime law but
explained that a desire for uniformity of recovery cannot prevail over the
statute.82 Even if the damages available in a wrongful death action in
territorial waters would differ from the same action on the high seas,
DOHSA controls and should be the primary guide in the Court’s
decision.83 Although general maritime law may supplement statutory
maritime law, “[t]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and

77. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
78. Id. at 620.
79. See 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2012) (“When the death of an individual is caused
by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical
miles from the shore of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel
responsible. The action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s spouse,
parent, child, or dependent relative.”). See also 46 U.S.C. § 30303 (“The recovery
in an action under this chapter shall be a fair compensation for the pecuniary loss
sustained by the individuals for whose benefit the action is brought. The court
shall apportion the recovery among those individuals in proportion to the loss each
has sustained.”) (emphasis added).
80. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414
U.S. 573, 587–88 (1974) (holding that a spouse could recover loss of society
damages under general maritime law for the wrongful death of the decedent
occurring in state territorial waters).
81. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 623.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 624.
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specifically enacted.”84 Therefore, the Court limited the measure of
damages in a wrongful death action occurring on the high seas to those
pecuniary losses allowed by DOHSA.85 After Higginbotham, the Supreme
Court decided another wrongful death case, which left the waters of
seaman recovery even murkier.
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.86 To
establish a uniform rule applicable to all wrongful death causes of action,
the Court held that the seaman’s survivors could not recover loss of society
damages in either a negligence action against the employer or an
unseaworthiness action against a vessel owner.87 The plaintiff brought suit
against Apex Marine Corporation and several other defendants as owners
of the vessel.88 The plaintiff alleged that the decedent’s Jones Act
employer negligently failed to prevent the death of her son.89 In addition,
the plaintiff contended that the defendant breached the general maritime
law warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel.90 The plaintiff sought several
categories of damages, including loss of society.91
The Court considered whether the Jones Act had the same preclusive
effect on recovery as DOHSA.92 The Court first turned to Higginbotham for
guidance.93 Traditionally, if Congress leaves an area of the law open,
admiralty courts supplement applicable maritime statutes.94 Higginbotham,
however, reasoned that “in an ‘area covered by the statute, it would be no
more appropriate to prescribe a different measure of damages than to
prescribe a different statute of limitations, or a different class of
beneficiaries.’”95 The Court found that the principle of Higginbotham
controlled the case before it96 and then turned to the preemptory effect of
the Jones Act on the recoverability of loss of society damages in a
wrongful death action against the Jones Act employer.97
84. Id. at 625.
85. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 21 (1990).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 32–33.
88. Id. at 21.
89. Id. A member of the crew of the M/V Archon stabbed the decedent
multiple times. Id.
90. Id. Plaintiff contended the vessel was unseaworthy because the defendant
hired a crew member unfit to serve. Id.
91. Id. at 21–22.
92. Id. at 31.
93. Id. at 31–33; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
94. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 at 625.
95. Miles, 498 U.S. at 31 (quoting Higginbotham, 439 U.S. at 625).
96. Id. at 32.
97. Id.
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The Supreme Court examined the history and purpose of the Jones
Act.98 In 1920, Congress enacted the Jones Act to overrule The Osceola99
and create a statutory negligence cause of action for the death or injury of
a seaman against his employer.100 Notably, “[t]he Jones Act evinces no
general hostility to recovery under [general] maritime law.”101 The statute
merely aimed to establish a uniform system of seaman tort law identical
to the tort remedies available to railway employees under FELA.102
Because the Jones Act incorporated FELA by reference, the Miles Court
examined FELA to determine if loss of society damages were available in a
FELA wrongful death cause of action.103 By its clear statutory language,
FELA declares that employers “shall be liable in damages.”104 Earlier cases
interpreting FELA wrongful death actions, however, had held that
recoverable damages were limited to pecuniary losses against the
employer.105 Relying on this limitation, the Miles Court concluded that
when Congress passed the Jones Act, incorporating FELA unaltered and its
progeny, Congress intended to impose a pecuniary limitation in the Jones
Act wrongful death action as well.106 Therefore, because FELA precluded
a wrongful death award of damages for loss of society, its identical

98. Id. at 29.
99. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
100. Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001).
101. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 (quoting Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 at 625).
102. Id. at 29 (“Rather, the Jones Act establishes a uniform system of seamen’s tort
law parallel to that available to employees of interstate railway carriers under FELA.”).
103. Id.
104. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012) (“Every common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or in the case of
the death of such employee, to his or her personal representative . . . for such
injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reasons of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery,
track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.”).
105. See Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70–71 (1913) (holding
that in a wrongful death action FELA limited the plaintiff’s recovery to pecuniary
damages, which did not include “damages by way of recompense for grief or
wounded feelings” nor the loss of society of the companion); see also David W.
Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend,
supra note 72, at 464–65 (“Pecuniary compensatory damages are those that are
measurable in money, at least notionally. In personal injury cases, the standard
pecuniary categories of compensatory damages are lost earnings and earning
capacity and medical and related expenses.”) (emphasis omitted).
106. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32.
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counterpart—the Jones Act—also precluded the recovery of non-pecuniary
damages.107
The Miles Court then extended this limitation of damages. The
plaintiff’s claim rested not only on the Jones Act but also on a general
maritime law claim for unseaworthiness.108 The Court, however, concluded
that the close relationship between the Jones Act and unseaworthiness
prohibited recovery of non-pecuniary damages in this separate cause of
action as well. Because Congress did not allow recovery of loss of society
damages in a cause of action that requires a showing of fault under the Jones
Act, it would be inappropriate for the Supreme Court to allow a more
expansive remedy in the judicially created unseaworthiness action, which
requires no showing of fault.109 Because statutory maritime law precluded
the recovery of loss of society in a wrongful death action, general maritime
law also precluded these damages to achieve a uniform rule in maritime law
for wrongful death causes of action.110
Although the Miles decision did not contemplate the issue of punitive
damages, many subsequent courts expanded the Miles uniformity
principle to preclude awarding punitive damages to seamen.111 Many
courts interpreted non-pecuniary damages to include punitive damages
and therefore disallowed their recovery under the Jones Act.112

107. Id. (“When Congress passed the Jones Act, the Vreeland gloss on FELA,
and the hoary tradition behind it, were well established. Incorporating FELA
unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate the
pecuniary limitation on damages as well. We assume that Congress is aware of
existing law when it passes legislation.”). Therefore, because FELA did not allow
recovery of loss of society damages, its counterpart, the Jones Act, also did not allow
such damages. Id.; see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 696–97 (1979)
(“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other
citizens, know the law.”).
108. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 32–33.
111. See McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015) (denying the recovery of punitive damages
in an unseaworthiness cause of action); Bergen v. F/V St. Patrick, 816 F.2d 1345,
1347 (9th Cir. 1987), opinion modified on reh’g, 866 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“Punitive damages are non-pecuniary damages unavailable under the Jones
Act.”); Miller v. Am. President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir. 1993)
(“Punitive damages are not therefore recoverable under the Jones Act.”).
112. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime Law,
supra note 60, at 143–55 (discussing cases denying punitive damages based on Miles).
See also Phillip M. Smith, Comment, A Watery Grave for Unseaworthiness Punitive
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ii. Sailing Miles Too Far
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit expanded the Miles pecuniary damage
limitation to deny a seaman the right to recover punitive damages in a
maintenance and cure cause of action.113 In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas
Corporation, the seaman-plaintiff filed suit against his employer, alleging
negligence under the Jones Act and an unseaworthiness claim under
general maritime law.114 In addition, Guevara requested punitive damages
for his employer’s failure to pay maintenance and cure.115
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court’s
award of punitive damages and extended the reasoning of Miles in finding
that general maritime law does not permit an award of punitive damages
for the willful refusal to pay maintenance and cure.116 In so doing, the Fifth
Circuit overruled Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.117 and In re Merry
Shipping.118 In Merry Shipping, the Fifth Circuit held that even if punitive
damages were not available under the Jones Act, it did not follow that
punitive damages also would be unavailable under general maritime law
for an unseaworthiness claim.119 Revisiting the same issue 14 years later,
the Fifth Circuit in Guevara reasoned that in light of the Miles decision,
the analysis of Merry Shipping was no longer sound.120
Adopting the analytical framework of Miles, the Fifth Circuit
articulated a test for whether Miles applies to a case to limit damages. The
court must first analyze the factual setting of the case at hand.121 If a federal
statute applies and directs or limits the recovery available in the situation,
then, the statute controls.122 Furthermore, the applicable statute also

Damages: McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., 76 LA. L. REV. 619, 635–38 (2015),
for a discussion of the analogy from loss of society damages to punitive damages.
113. See Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1513 (5th Cir. 1995)
(en banc), abrogated by Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
114. Id. at 1499.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1496.
117. Holmes v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 734 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the court may award punitive damages under general maritime law if the
employer willfully and callously refuses to pay maintenance and cure to a seaman).
118. In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
the court may award punitive damages under general maritime law for an
unseaworthiness cause of action).
119. Id.
120. Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1504. See supra Part I.C.2.a.i.
121. Guevara, 59 F.3d at 1506.
122. Id.
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precludes or limits the recovery available under general maritime law.123
The Fifth Circuit found that “[a]lthough the Miles Court did not mention
punitive damages, they are also rightfully classified as non-pecuniary.”124
Therefore, even though the Miles Court did not address punitive damages,
the Fifth Circuit in Guevara expanded Miles to preclude the recovery of
those damages.
Applying this test, the Fifth Circuit concluded that maintenance and
cure actually involves two types of actions.125 The “tort-like” maintenance
and cure action requires personal injury and the “contract-like” action
may, but need not, involve personal injury.126 Because the tort-like
maintenance and cure action includes personal injury, it “overlaps with the
personal injury coverage of the Jones Act”127 and therefore invokes the
Miles uniformity of damages principle.
Guevara, however, brought a “contract-like” maintenance and cure
cause of action.128 Even though no statutory overlap existed because the
claim did not involve personal injury, “[the Fifth Circuit] believe[d] that
punitive damages should not be available in any action for maintenance
and cure, even in those contract-like actions that can only be brought under
the general maritime law.”129 The Fifth Circuit’s concern with uniformity
precluded an award of punitive damages in both types of maintenance and
cure actions; therefore, a seaman no longer possessed a claim for punitive
damages for willful nonpayment of maintenance and cure under general
maritime law.130 In a subsequent case, the Fifth Circuit expanded this
reasoning to preclude an award of non-pecuniary damages in another,
completely separate cause of action that neither requires nor contemplates
an employment relationship.

123. Id. Stated another way, the Fifth Circuit explained,
[A] court must first evaluate the factual setting of the case and determine
what statutory remedial measure, if any, apply in that context. If the
situation is covered by a statute like the Jones Act or DOHSA, and the
statute informs and limits the available damages, the statute directs and
delimits the recovery available under the general maritime law as well.
Id.
124. Id. (citing Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084, 1094
(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114 (1994)).
125. Id. at 1511.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1512.
130. Id. at 1513.
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b. Uncharted Waters: Applying Miles to a Separate and Distinct
Cause of Action
In 2005, the Fifth Circuit, armed with the Miles uniformity principle
and Guevara, concluded that neither a Jones Act seaman nor his survivors
could recover non-pecuniary losses against a third-party non-employer.131
From 1958 until 1967, William Scarborough worked aboard sandblasting
vessels for two companies.132 Ten years after ending his employment as a
sandblaster, Scarborough discovered that his exposure to siliceous
particles during his employment caused him to contract silicosis.133
Scarborough passed away from his illness in March 2002.134
Following his death, Scarborough’s wife and adult children instituted
a wrongful death suit against several defendants, seeking pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damages.135 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana concluded that under the Miles uniformity
principle, a Jones Act seaman’s survivors could not recover non-pecuniary
damages from a third party non-employer.136 The plaintiffs subsequently
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.137
The Fifth Circuit reviewed whether the Miles uniformity principle
precluded the recovery of non-pecuniary damages.138 The court reiterated
that Miles disallowed the recovery of loss of society damages in a general
maritime wrongful death action to “‘restor[e] a uniform rule applicable to
all actions for the wrongful death of a seaman.’”139 The plaintiffs
attempted to distinguish Miles by arguing that the defendants were thirdparty non-employers, thereby not invoking the Jones Act.140 The Fifth
Circuit turned to its earlier decision, Guevara, for guidance on this issue.
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the Guevara test of when the Miles
uniformity principle limits the recovery of damages.141 If the factual
situation implicates a statutory remedial measure and that statute limits
131. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005).
132. Id.
133. Scarborough v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 718 F.2d 130, 132 (5th Cir. 1983).
134. Id.
135. Scarborough, 391 F.3d at 663.
136. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 264 F. Supp. 2d 437, 447 (E.D. La. 2003),
aff'd, 391 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2004).
137. Scarborough, 391 F.3d at 663.
138. Id. at 666.
139. Id. (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990)).
140. Id. at 667.
141. See supra Part I.C.2.a.ii.
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recovery, then the recovery under general maritime law also will be
limited.142 The Guevara principles could not be met in this factual setting
because the plaintiffs brought suit against a third-party non-employer and
not the Jones Act employer.143 Even if the Guevara principles for
application of Miles did not apply, however, Guevara still controlled the
issue before the court.144 In Guevara, the court found that even though a
congressional statute did not directly apply, the statute should apply to
“highly analogous factual scenarios.”145 Additionally, courts should not
allow a greater remedy in a judicially created cause of action than
Congress allowed in the related remedial scheme. Therefore, the concern
for uniformity in federal maritime law discouraged allowing recovery of a
type of damages in one class of actions but not in another.146
A panel of the Fifth Circuit, applying the Guevara reasoning,
determined that the Scarborough plaintiffs’ action against a non-employer
maritime tortfeasor was analogous to a Jones Act negligence claim against
the employer.147 Just as Congress disallowed the recovery of nonpecuniary damages in a Jones Act suit, the court determined that it would
be inappropriate to award identical damages to the surviving spouse and
heirs in an analogous suit against the third-party tortfeasor—the
manufacturers of siliceous materials.148 The Fifth Circuit would not ignore
the “bright line directive of Miles” that limits recovery to pecuniary
damages.149 Miles “is concerned with uniformity in the damages
recoverable by a Jones Act seaman and his survivors, not with uniformity
of the types of damages to which various defendants are subjected.” 150
Relying on its Guevara analysis of Miles, the court ultimately found that
neither a Jones Act seaman nor his survivors may recover non-pecuniary
damages from third-party non-employers.151 But the Supreme Court since
has eroded plaintiff recovery limitations under general maritime law.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See supra Part I.C.2.a.ii.
Scarborough, 391 F.3d at 668.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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c. Punitive Damages Under General Maritime Law
On March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez, supervised by
Captain Joseph Hazelwood, ran aground on a reef along the Alaskan
coast.152 The collision ruptured the ship’s hull, and it spilled millions of
gallons of oil into the Prince William Sound.153 After Exxon settled claims
for environmental damage, commercial fishermen and native Alaskans
brought suit for economic losses to their livelihoods, which were
dependent on the Sound.154
At the district court level, a class of plaintiffs sought punitive damages
from Exxon.155 The jury heard evidence of Exxon’s management’s acts
and omissions relevant to the spill, including Exxon’s knowledge of
Captain Hazelwood’s alcohol addiction and subsequent relapse.156 The
court instructed the jury on the purpose of punitive damages and asked the
jury to consider “the reprehensibility of the defendants’ conduct, their
financial condition, the magnitude of the harm, and any mitigating facts”
in awarding any punitive damages.157 The jury awarded $5,000 in punitive
damages against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon.158 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals lowered the award against Exxon to
$2.5 billion.159 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether
the punitive damages award was (1) permissible; and, if so, (2) excessive
under maritime common law.160

152. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 481.
156. Id. at 476–77 (“According to the District Court, ‘[t]here was evidence
presented to the jury that after Hazelwood was released from [residential
treatment], he drank in bars, parking lots, apartments, airports, airplanes,
restaurants, hotels, at various ports, and aboard Exxon tankers.’”). Hours after the
collision, the Coast Guard tested Hazelwood’s blood alcohol level, and experts
estimated his blood-alcohol level at the time of the crash to be around .241–three
times the legal limit for driving in a majority of states. Id.
157. Id. at 481.
158. Id.
159. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).
160. Baker, 554 U.S. at 481. The Court also considered whether maritime law
allows corporate liability for punitive damages based on agency principles and
whether the Clean Water Act precluded the award of punitive damages in
maritime spill cases. Id.
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Considering whether the award was permissible, the Supreme Court
began its analysis with a historical overview of punitive damages.161
Courts throughout the United States frequently award exemplary or
punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages, and “the
consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but
principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”162 After
determining that the only applicable federal statute did not preclude an
award of punitive damages, the Court affirmed the award of punitive
damages under general maritime law but reduced the amount as
excessive.163 One year later, the Court addressed whether a Jones Act
seaman could recover punitive damages against his employer.164
d. Seamen Can Recover Punitive Damages from Their Employer
In 2009, the Supreme Court decided a landmark case involving punitive
damages in a seaman’s claim against his Jones Act employer. In Atlantic
Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, the Court held that a Jones Act seaman
could recover punitive damages against his employer for a willful and
wanton disregard of its general maritime obligation to pay maintenance and
cure benefits to a seaman.165 The plaintiff, Edgar L. Townsend, worked as a
crewmember of a tugboat.166 While aboard the vessel, the plaintiff fell on
the steel deck and injured his arm and shoulder.167 After the accident, the
plaintiff claimed that his employer, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc., advised him
that it would not provide maintenance and cure.168 Townsend filed suit
against his employer, alleging negligence under general maritime law and
the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, “arbitrary and willful failure to pay
maintenance and cure,” and wrongful termination.169 The plaintiff also

161. Id. at 490–91 (“[P]unitive damages were a common law innovation
untethered to strict numerical multipliers, and the doctrine promptly crossed the
Atlantic to become widely accepted in American courts by the middle of the 19th
century.”) (internal citations omitted).
162. Id. at 492.
163. Id. at 476.
164. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law:
Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 72, at 476–77.
165. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424–25 (2009).
166. Id. at 407.
167. Id.
168. Id. The employer filed an action for declaratory relief in connection to its
duty to pay maintenance and cure. Id. at 408.
169. Id. at 408.
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sought punitive damages for the employer’s denial of maintenance and
cure.170
The Court relied on three arguments to allow the recovery of punitive
damages.171 First, punitive damages “have long been an available remedy
at common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct.”172 The Court
cited multiple cases dating back from 17th-century England to 19thcentury America indicating the jury’s ability to award any damages it sees
fit, including punitive damages.173 Furthermore, the Court pointed out
several cases in which it acknowledged the common-law doctrine of
punitive damages.174 Second, the Court extended this common-law doctrine
to claims arising under general maritime law.175 Third, the Court examined
the historical recognition of a seaman’s right to maintenance and cure and
determined that statutory federal admiralty law did not preclude the
application of this doctrine of punitive damages to a claim in the
maintenance and cure context.176
170. Id.
171. Id. at 424–25.
172. Id. at 409.
173. Id. at 411–12.
174. Id. at 410. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (“It is a wellestablished principle of the common law . . . a jury may inflict what are called
exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the
enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.”);
Phila., W. & B.R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 214 (1858) (“Whenever the injury
complained of has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances
of contumely or indignity, the jury are not limited to the ascertainment of a simple
compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person.”); Barry v.
Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 562 (1886) (“In addition, according to the settled law of
this court, [the plaintiff] might show himself, by proof of the circumstances, to be
entitled to exemplary damages calculated to vindicate his right and protect it
against future similar invasions.”).
175. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 411. See Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice,
147 U.S. 101, 108 (1893) (“The rule . . . is not peculiar to courts of admiralty; for .
. . those courts proceed, in cases of tort, upon the same principles as courts of
common law, in allowing exemplary damages, as well as damages by way of
compensation or remuneration for expenses incurred, or injuries or losses sustained,
by the misconduct of the other party.”); see also Boston Mfg Co. v. Fiske, 3 F. Cas.
957 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (“In cases of marine torts . . . it is far from being
uncommon in the admiralty to allow costs and expences [sic], and to mulct the
offending parties, even in exemplary damages, where the nature of the case requires
it. Courts of admiralty allow such items . . . but upon the same principles, as they
are often allowed damages in cases of torts, by courts of common law, as a
recompense for injuries sustained, as exemplary damages.”).
176. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 412–14.
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Significantly, the Court explained that nothing in the Jones Act
indicated any deviance from this common-law doctrine.177 Looking at the
text of the Jones Act, the Court concluded that it “created a statutory cause
of action for negligence, but it did not eliminate pre-existing remedies
available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of action based on
a seaman’s right to maintenance and cure.”178 The Jones Act gives a seaman
the ability to elect to bring a claim against his employer for negligence; thus,
neither the language of the Jones Act nor its jurisprudential progeny bar the
recovery of punitive damages in a maintenance and cure claim.179
The Court then turned to the so-called Miles principle of uniformity.180
The Court distinguished that Miles arose from a general maritime law
wrongful death cause of action based on the unseaworthiness of the
vessel.181 Although the “reasoning of Miles remain[ed] sound,”182 the
Court found that it did not apply to the case at hand because neither the
Death on the High Seas Act183 nor the Jones Act addressed a seaman’s
right to maintenance and cure.184 Because “no statute [cast] doubt on their
availability under general maritime law,”185 the seaman-plaintiff would be
entitled to recover punitive damages under general maritime law for the
employer’s arbitrary and willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.186
Although the Miles decision predicated its reasoning on the maritime
principle of uniformity, the Court undermined that notion by stating, “[t]he
laudable quest for uniformity in admiralty does not require the narrowing
of available damages to the lowest common denominator approved by
Congress for distinct causes of action.”187 The Court’s decision expressly
177. Id. at 415.
178. Id. at 415–16.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 418.
181. Id. at 419. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
182. See Miles, 498 U.S. 19, 36–37 (holding that because loss of society is
unavailable in a Jones Act seaman wrongful death claim then loss of society
damages must also be unavailable in a general maritime law unseaworthiness
wrongful death cause of action).
183. See 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2012) (“When the death of an individual is caused
by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical
miles from the shore of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel
responsible. The action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's spouse,
parent, child, or dependent relative.”).
184. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 419.
185. Id. at 421.
186. Id. at 425.
187. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
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abrogated the Fifth Circuit decision in Guevara,188 which the Scarborough
court notably relied heavily upon to expand the Miles uniformity principle
to third-party tortfeasors in a distinct cause of action.189
Townsend potentially parted the seas for a Jones Act seaman to recover
punitive damages under general maritime law. The Court limited its
decision to the narrow issue of punitive damages in the maintenance and
cure context, leaving unanswered whether seamen can recover punitive
damages in other contexts.190 The Supreme Court, however, provided a key
analytical framework for determining the recovery of punitive damages
based on three inquiries.191 First, does the cause of action invoke any directly
applicable federal statute? Second, did the cause of action preexist the
federal statute? Finally, does the applicable federal statute displace an award
of punitive damages?192
After Townsend, in McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C., the en banc
Fifth Circuit held that even though the seaman-plaintiff’s general maritime
law unseaworthiness claim did not invoke statutory maritime law, the
plaintiff could not recover punitive damages from his employer.193 Relying
on Miles, the court concluded that the Jones Act limited a seaman’s
recovery to pecuniary losses when liability arose from the Jones Act or
unseaworthiness.194 Moreover, the court found that punitive damages
should be classified as non-pecuniary and therefore unrecoverable.195 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari.196
In the context of a cause of action against a third-party non-employer,
however, neither unseaworthiness nor the Jones Act apply. The general
maritime tort cause of action against a third party is wholly and distinctly

188. Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1513 (5th Cir. 1995),
abrogated by Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
189. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 667 (5th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005).
190. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014) (en
banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015) (considering the availability of
punitive damages in an unseaworthy action); Batterton v. Dutra Grp., No. 1556775, 2018 WL 505256 (9th Cir. 2018) (considering the same issue as McBride).
191. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 424–25.
192. Id.
193. McBride, 768 F.3d at 390–91 (holding neither a seaman nor his survivors
could recover punitive damages in a general maritime law unseaworthiness cause
of action).
194. Id. at 384.
195. Id.
196. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
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separate from the Jones Act and unseaworthiness.197 A claim against a
third-party non-employer necessarily requires a different analytical
approach than courts adopt in a cause of action against the Jones Act
employer. Neither McBride nor Townsend involved third-party tortfeasor
liability, leaving a whirlpool of unanswered questions for lower courts to
navigate.
II. A SHIPWRECK IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
Recently, several judges in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana addressed whether a seaman may recover
punitive damages against a non-employer third party based on a general
maritime law tort claim.198 Two judges, interpreting United States
Supreme Court precedent, held that punitive damages remain available to
seamen in their general maritime law claims against third parties.199 Other
judges, adhering to Scarborough,200 refused to allow recovery of these
damages.201 The same judge that first held that seamen could recover
punitive damages changed course, however, and held the exact opposite
two years later.202 As of now, a maritime plaintiff’s ultimate recovery in
the Eastern District could be determined simply based on which judge the
court assigns to the case. The uncertainty caused by this split should

197. See Smith, supra note 112, at 635–38 (providing an in-depth analysis of
McBride, its holding, and its legacy).
198. See Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL
5254710 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015) (Fallon, J.); Hume v. Consol. Grain & Barge,
Inc., No. 15-0935, 2016 WL 1089349 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2016) (Zainey, J.);
Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, L.L.C., No. 13-4811, 2015 WL 7428581 (E.D. La.
Nov. 20, 2015) (Morgan, J.). All judges referenced in Part II preside in the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
199. See Collins, 2015 WL 5254710 (Fallon, J.); Hume, 2016 WL 1089349
(Zainey, J.). But see Wade v. Clemco Indus. Corp., No. 16-502, 2017 WL 434425
(E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2017) (Fallon, J.) (Judge Fallon changing course and disallowing
punitive damages based on Scarborough).
200. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
544 U.S. 999 (2005) (holding that neither a Jones Act seaman nor his survivors
could recover non-pecuniary damages from third parties).
201. Howard, 2015 WL 7428581 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015) (Morgan, J.); Rockett
v. Belle Chasse Marine Trans., L.L.C., No. 17-229, 2017 WL 2226319 (E.D. La. May
22, 2017) (Lemmon, J.); Rinehart v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco L.P., No. 15-6266, 2017 WL
1407699 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2017) (Fallon, J.); Schutt v. All. Marine Servs. L.P., No.
16-15733, 2017 WL 2313199 (E.D. La. May 26, 2017) (Lemelle, J.).
202. Wade, 2017 WL 434425 (Fallon, J.).
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motivate the Fifth Circuit, en banc, to clarify its prior precedent or overrule
Scarborough.
A. Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C.
On August 13, 2014, a vessel towing a crane barge allided203 with the
Florida Avenue lift bridge in the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal in
Orleans Parish.204 The mast of the crane barge hit the bridge and caused
the crane boom to crash onto the pilot house, killing Michael Collins, a
barge worker.205
Collins’s widow brought suit against her husband’s Jones Act
employer/vessel owner, alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.206 The
widow also brought suit for negligence under general maritime law against
the owner of the crane barge and the Port of New Orleans (“Port”) as
owner and operator of the lift bridge.207 The plaintiff sought punitive
damages from the Port, alleging gross negligence.208 The Port argued that
the Jones Act and general maritime law precluded an award of punitive
damages.209
Judge Fallon noted that the decedent was a Jones Act seaman killed in
Louisiana territorial waters by the alleged gross negligence of a third-party
tortfeasor who did not employ the seaman.210 Therefore, the claim arose
under general maritime law.211 The Port argued that the plaintiff could not
recover punitive damages from it based on Miles, McBride, and
Scarborough.212 The plaintiff contended that none of the three cases were
203. See Allision, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“allision” as “the contact of a vessel with a stationary object such as an anchored
vessel or a pier”).
204. Collins, 2015 WL 5254710, at *1.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *2.
211. Id.
212. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) (holding there is no
recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a
Jones Act seaman); McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir.
2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015) (holding that neither a seaman
nor his survivors could recover punitive damages in a general maritime law
unseaworthiness cause of action); Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660 (5th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005) (holding that neither a Jones Act
seaman nor his survivors could recover non-pecuniary damages from third parties).
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dispositive.213 Therefore, the court needed to decide whether a seaman’s
limited right to recover only pecuniary damages against his employer,
established in Miles and affirmed in McBride, extended to a non-employer
third-party tortfeasor.214
After discussing the reasoning of Townsend,215 Judge Fallon
concluded that the Jones Act had no bearing on the plaintiff’s claim against
a non-employer defendant.216 McBride and Miles precluded recovery of
non-pecuniary damages only from the seaman’s employer, not as against
a third-party tortfeasor under general maritime law.217 Judge Fallon
concluded that in a general maritime law claim against a third party nonemployer, it made no difference whether the plaintiff was a “seaman, a
longshoreman or a passenger,” and “there [was] no need for uniform
treatment of an employer and a third party tortfeasor where there is no
statutory remedy that is different than the general maritime law remedy.”218
The plaintiff’s status as a seaman was irrelevant in a suit against a
third-party tortfeasor; the only relevant inquiry was whether the seaman’s
personal representative could assert a claim for punitive damages based on
gross negligence under general maritime law.219 Citing Townsend and
Baker,220 Judge Fallon concluded that general maritime law did allow the
plaintiff to recover punitive damages from a non-employer third party.221
Judge Fallon then discussed this issue in light of Scarborough.222 In
Scarborough, the Fifth Circuit held “that neither one who has invoked his
Jones Act seaman status nor his survivors may recover nonpecuniary
damages from non-employer third parties.”223 Judge Fallon noted that
Scarborough relied on Guevara224 to expand Miles to eliminate the
seaman’s potential punitive damage recovery from third parties.225
Although Scarborough theoretically binds district courts within the Fifth

213. Collins, 2015 WL 5254710, at *2.
214. Id.
215. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
216. Collins, 2015 WL 5254710, at *2.
217. Id. at *4.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra Part I.C.2.c. for a discussion of Baker.
221. Collins, 2015 WL 5254710, at *4.
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 668 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 999 (2005)).
224. Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1513 (5th Cir. 1995),
abrogated by Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).
225. Collins, 2015 WL 5254710, at *4.
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Circuit, Judge Fallon concluded that Scarborough “has been effectively
overruled” by Townsend.226 He determined that because Townsend
abrogated Guevara, upon which the Scarborough holding was based,
“Scarborough is inconsistent with current Supreme Court precedent.”227
Therefore, Scarborough did not bind the district court. Judge Fallon
concluded that, based on Townsend, if the Jones Act does not apply, a
seaman should recover punitive damages under general maritime law and
be treated no differently than a non-seaman.228 Because the plaintiff
asserted a claim under general maritime law and not the Jones Act, she
could pursue general maritime law punitive damages from the third-party
non-employer tortfeasor.229
B. Hume v. Consolidated Grain & Barge, Inc.
Corey Hume and Clarence Robinson both worked as seamen aboard
the M/V Bayou Special for the defendant, Consolidated Grain & Barge,
Inc. (“CGB”).230 While at work, both plaintiffs suffered injuries and
shortly thereafter instituted litigation against their employer, CGB,
seeking damages for Jones Act negligence, unseaworthiness, and
maintenance and cure.231 They also brought suit against Quality Marine,232
alleging negligence and unseaworthiness.233 Additionally, they sought
punitive damages from both defendants under general maritime law.234
To support its motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim,235
Quality Marine relied on the United States Fifth Circuit precedent of

226. Id. at *5.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Hume v. Consol. Grain & Barge, Inc., No. 15-0935, 2016 WL 1089349,
at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2016).
231. Seamen’s Complaint for Damages at 3–4, Hume v. Consol. Grain &
Barge, Inc., No. 15-0935, 2016 WL 1089349 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2016).
232. See Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at *1. Quality Marine owned the M/V
Lewis, which pushed the M/V Bayou Special. Id.
233. Id.
234. Seamen’s Complaint for Damages, supra note 231, at 5.
235. Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at *1. The court dismissed the punitive
damages claim against CGB and only needed to decide whether punitive damages
could be recovered against the third party non-employer tortfeasor. Id.

976

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

McBride236 and Scarborough.237 In McBride, the Fifth Circuit cited
Miles,238 which limited a Jones Act seaman’s recovery to pecuniary losses
if liability arose from the Jones Act or unseaworthiness.239 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that because punitive damages are considered nonpecuniary240 losses, the injured seaman in McBride could not recover
punitive damages against his employer.241
Quality Marine also cited Scarborough,242 an earlier decision in the
Fifth Circuit.243 Scarborough also relied on Miles to conclude that neither
a seaman who has invoked the Jones Act nor his survivors may recover
punitive damages from a non-employer third party.244 To allow recovery
of non-pecuniary damages would be inconsistent with the Jones Act in
which Congress precluded the recovery of such damages in a Jones Act
suit.245
The plaintiffs countered Quality Marine’s cited caselaw by relying on
Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C.246 Judge Zainey agreed with
Judge Fallon’s decision in Collins.247 Similar to Collins, the Hume
plaintiffs’ claim against a third-party non-employer, Quality Marine, did
not implicate the Jones Act.248
Judge Zainey agreed that Scarborough has been “effectively
overruled” by the Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend.249 As “the Jones
236. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014) (en
banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
237. Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
544 U.S. 999 (2005).
238. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
239. Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at *2 (citing McBride, 768 F.3d at 384 (citing
Miles, 498 U.S. 19)).
240. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law:
Miles, Baker, and Townsend, supra note 72, at 473–75 (proposing punitive
damages are pecuniary losses and not non-pecuniary).
241. McBride, 768 F.3d at 391.
242. Scarborough, 391 F.3d at 668 (holding that neither a Jones Act seaman
nor his survivors could recover non-pecuniary damages from third parties).
243. Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at *1.
244. Id. at *2 (quoting Scarborough, 391 F.3d at 668). Quality Marine
misstated the holding of Scarborough, which addressed non-pecuniary damages,
not punitive damages. Id.; see also Scarborough, 391 F.3d at 668.
245. Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at *2. See Scarborough, 391 F.3d 660.
246. Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL
5254710, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015).
247. See supra Part II.A.
248. Hume, 2016 WL 1089349, at *2.
249. Id. at *3 (citing Collins, 2015 WL 5254710).
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Act has no bearing on Plaintiffs’ claims against Quality Marine,” the
seamen could recover punitive damages under general maritime law
against the non-employer tortfeasor.250
C. Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, L.L.C.
Contrary to Judge Fallon and Judge Zainey’s reasoning, Judge
Morgan took a different approach and denied the possibility of recovering
punitive damages from a third party non-employer.251 Raymond and
Calvin Howard were injured during a personnel-basket transfer from the
M/V Contender to the deck of the L/B Janie.252 Offshore Liftboats, LLC
(“OLB”) employed both plaintiffs and owned the L/B Janie.253 K & K
Offshore, LLC (“KKO”) owned and operated the M/V Contender.254 The
plaintiffs filed suit against OLB as their Jones Act employer, claiming
negligence and seeking punitive damages as relief.255 The two plaintiffs
also sued KKO under general maritime law as a non-employer third party
for negligence and unseaworthiness and sought to recover punitive
damages.256
In its defense, KKO argued that McBride257 controlled the case at
hand. The plaintiffs cited Collins as support for the recoverability of
punitive damages from the non-employer third party defendant.258 Judge
Morgan rejected the plaintiffs’ argument and disagreed with Judge
Fallon’s reasoning in Collins.259
Judge Morgan noted that the Townsend decision specifically applied
to the Jones Act plaintiff’s maintenance and cure claim against the Jones
Act employer.260 The Supreme Court in Townsend carefully differentiated
the historical maintenance and cure cause of action from a seaman’s
remedies for negligence and unseaworthiness.261 Judge Morgan concluded
that “although Townsend may give hope to seamen wishing to obtain

250. Id.
251. Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, L.L.C., No. 13-4811, 2015 WL 7428581,
at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See supra Part I.C.2.d.
258. See supra Part II.A.
259. Howard, 2015 WL 7428581, at *2.
260. Id.
261. See id.
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punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims against their employers and
non-employers, ‘this [c]ourt cannot assume the Fifth Circuit has changed
its position on personal injury claims falling outside the scope of
Townsend.’”262 Furthermore, Judge Morgan noted that Scarborough has
never been overruled and thus remains binding on the Eastern District.263
Accordingly, Judge Morgan granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.264
D. Wade v. Clemco Industries Corp.
Two years after the Collins decision, Judge Fallon changed course and
denied awarding punitive damages against a third-party non-employer in
Wade v. Clemco Industries Corp.265 Garland R. Wade, the decedent,
worked as a sandblaster and paint sprayer on vessels owned by Coating
Specialists Inc. He also performed work in Louisiana and federal waters
on permanent fixed platforms owned and/or operated by Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. (“Chevron”).266 Plaintiff, Wade’s widow, brought suit against Clemco
Industries Corp. (“Clemco”), Mississippi Valley Silica Company (“MV”),
Lamorak Insurance Co. (“Lamorak”), and Chevron, alleging that defective
design, manufacture, and distribution of the materials used by the decedent
in his work exposed him to silica and led to his cancer, which eventually
caused his premature death.267 Wade’s widow also claimed failure to warn
and failure to provide sufficient equipment and protective gear by Clemco,
MV, and Chevron.268 She requested more than $5 million in damages,
including punitive damages for non-pecuniary losses.269 Lamorak, MV,
Clemco, and Chevron all filed motions for partial summary judgment to
dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages.270
The defendants argued that, based on Scarborough, Wade’s widow
could not recover her non-pecuniary damages. Specifically, they argued
that Townsend did not overrule Scarborough as to the availability of non262. Id. (quoting In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf
of Mex., No. 2179, 2011 WL 4575696, at *11 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2011), amended
(Oct. 4, 2011)).
263. Id.
264. Id. at *3.
265. Wade v. Clemco Indus. Corp., No. 16-502, 2017 WL 434425 (E.D. La.
Feb. 1, 2017) (Fallon, J.).
266. Id. at *1.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at *2.
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pecuniary damages against a non-employer third party.271 Instead, it
simply allowed a seaman to recover punitive damages for the willful and
arbitrary withholding of maintenance and cure payments.272 Plaintiff
countered that the Eastern District’s decision in Collins, not Scarborough,
applied to the case because “the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Scarborough
was based on Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., which was abrogated
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Townsend.”273 Thus, because
Scarborough was no longer good law, a plaintiff who brings a claim that
does not implicate the Jones Act should be treated no differently than any
non-seaman.274
Evaluating the parties’ arguments, Judge Fallon explained that “[t]his
court is faced with the purely legal question of whether a seaman can
recover non-pecuniary damages against a non-employer third-party
tortfeasor under general maritime law.”275 Judge Fallon then noted initially
that the availability of punitive damages under common law and general
maritime law predates the Constitution.276 In spite of this long history,
however, the Supreme Court held in Miles that a seaman could not recover
non-pecuniary damages from his or her Jones Act employer under either a
negligence or unseaworthiness claim.277 The Miles Court explained, “it would
be inconsistent with this Court’s place in the constitutional scheme to sanction
more expansive remedies for the judicially created unseaworthiness cause of
action, in which liability is without fault, than Congress has allowed in cases
of death resulting from negligence.”278 Judge Fallon noted that since the
Miles decision, trial and appellate courts nearly eliminated non-pecuniary
damages in maritime personal injury law and wrongful death cases—until
Townsend.279
In Townsend, the Supreme Court disturbed the trend of disallowing
non-pecuniary damages by “explaining that its holding in Miles did not
abolish all punitive damages under maritime law, as many courts seemed
to be interpreting the decision.”280 Moreover, Judge Fallon noted that the
Townsend Court “reiterated that ‘[b]ecause punitive damages have long
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at *3.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *4.
276. Id. (citing Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409–11 (2009)).
277. Id. (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 20 (1990)).
278. Id. (quoting Miles, 498 U.S. at 20).
279. See, e.g., Michel v. Total Transp., Inc., 957 F.2d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1992);
Murray v. Anthony J. Bertucci Const. Co., 958 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1992).
280. Wade, 2017 WL 434425, at *4 (citing Townsend, 557 U.S. at 420).
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been an accepted remedy under general maritime law, and because nothing
in the Jones Act altered this understanding, such damages for the willful
and wanton disregard of the maintenance and cure obligations should
remain available.’”281 The Townsend Court explained that lower courts
read Miles far too broadly.282 Furthermore, Judge Fallon explained that
after Townsend, it became uncertain whether Townsend limited the
recovery of punitive damages under general maritime law to only
maintenance and cure claims or if plaintiffs could recover for other nonmaintenance and cure claims.283
Judge Fallon, however, then cited to McBride v. Estis Well Service,
L.L.C., an en banc Fifth Circuit decision that held that neither a seaman
nor his survivor could recover punitive damages for personal injury or
wrongful death claims based on either the Jones Act or general maritime
law.284 McBride also confirmed that the reasoning of Miles “remain[ed]
sound” for seaman personal injury and wrongful death claims.285 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned, similar to Miles, that it could not allow for more
expansive damages for an action based on unseaworthiness than Congress
allowed under the Jones Act.286 Stated a different way, the Townsend
holding would be limited to maintenance and cure claims.
Judge Fallon then turned to his earlier decision in Collins. In Collins,
Judge Fallon noted that neither Miles nor the en banc McBride decisions
addressed an action by a seaman against a non-employer third-party
tortfeasor.287 Judge Fallon changed positions from Collins, however,
explaining that because the plaintiff elected to bring her claim under general
maritime law, she is bound by any limitations that exist under general
maritime law.288 Citing to McBride, Judge Fallon further explained, “[i]t has
become clear since the en banc opinion in McBride that in wrongful death
cases brought under general maritime law, a survivor’s recovery from

281. Id. (quoting Townsend, 557 U.S. at 419–20).
282. Id.
283. Compare Snyder v. L&M Botruc Rental, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 728, 737
(E.D. La. 2013) (dismissing claims for punitive damages under general maritime
law), with Callahan v. Gulf Logistics, L.L.C., No. 06-0561, 2013 WL 5236888,
at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 16, 2013) (holding that claimant could pursue punitive
damages under general maritime law).
284. McBride v. Estis Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
285. Wade, 2017 WL 434425, at *4 (quoting McBride, 768 F.3d at 385).
286. McBride, 768 F.3d at 388–89.
287. Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL
5254710 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015).
288. Wade, 2017 WL 434425, at *5.
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employers and non-employers is limited to pecuniary losses.”289
Moreover, Judge Fallon bolstered this assertion by arguing that
Scarborough supported this position and “[w]hile the Scarborough
decision at one time seemed to be undermined by Townsend, it has been
given clarity and vitality by the en banc decision in McBride.”290
According to Judge Fallon, based on Scarborough and McBride, “the Fifth
Circuit has now made it clear that under both the Jones Act and general
maritime law, a seaman’s damages against both employers and nonemployers are limited to pecuniary losses.”291 Hence, Judge Fallon granted
the defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment and dismissed the
plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages.292
A plaintiff filing in the Eastern District of Louisiana faces uncertainty
depending on which judge presides. These conflicting decisions and
others293 have brought the issue of liability of third-party tortfeasors to the
forefront of maritime law and signal the need to settle the murky waters of
punitive damages. Although Judge Zainey may stand alone in his finding,
the Fifth Circuit may soon join him by applying the principles set forth in
Townsend.294

289. Id. (citing McBride, 768 F.3d at 391).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Rockett v. Belle Chasse Marine Transp., L.L.C., No. 17-229, 2017 WL
2226319 (E.D. La. May 22, 2017) (Lemmon, J.) (holding that because the Fifth
Circuit has not overruled Scarborough, neither a seaman nor a seaman’s survivors
could recover punitive damages from a non-employer third party for negligence or
unseaworthiness under general maritime law); Rinehardt v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco
L.P., No. 15-6266, 2017 WL 1407699 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2017) (Fallon, J.) (granting
the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff’s
claims for punitive damages against a third-party non-employer).
294. See infra Part III; see also Schutt v. All. Marine Servs. L.P., No. 16-15733,
2017 WL 2313199 (E.D. La. May 26, 2017) (Lemelle, J.), appeal docketed
(considering only the purely legal question of whether a Jones Act seaman may
recover punitive damages from a third party non-employer). This case was
consolidated with Rockett v. Belle Chasse Marine Trans., L.L.C., No. 17-30470
(E.D. La. June 7, 2017). Both cases were later dismissed, Schutt on Jan. 5, 2018 and
Rockett on Mar. 7, 2018. See Schutt v. All. Marine Servs., L.P., 2:16-cv-15733 (E.D.
La. Jan 5, 2018); Rocket v. Belle Chasse Marine Trans., L.L.C., 2:17-CV-229 (5th
Cir. Mar. 7, 2018).
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III. THE CHANGING TIDES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER GENERAL
MARITIME LAW
Since Townsend, the Supreme Court has not addressed punitive
damages in maritime law involving a Jones Act seaman. Townsend’s
holding, however, suggests a change or clarification in the tides of seaman
recovery. No longer should a seaman be denied the same right granted to a
non-seaman against a non-employer third-party maritime tortfeasor simply
because of his employment connection to a vessel.
A. Punitive Damages Are Available Under General Maritime Law
The Supreme Court has acknowledged and affirmed that general
maritime law recognizes punitive damages as a remedy when not
precluded by an applicable federal statute. In both Townsend and Baker,295
the Supreme Court awarded punitive damages in claims predicated on
general maritime law liability. Although the Court did not decide whether
a Jones Act seaman can recover general maritime law punitive damages
from a third-party non-employer, this claim does not implicate the Jones
Act. With no preclusive federal statute, seamen should be given the full
array of remedies.
B. Punitive Damages Should Be Available to a Jones Act Seamen for a
Third Party’s Misconduct
Seamen should be able to recover punitive damages under general
maritime law against a third-party non-employer for three reasons. First,
the Jones Act expanded the remedies available to seamen: Congress did
not intend to limit any existing available remedies.296 Second, a seaman’s
claim against a third party does not pertain to a Jones Act negligence claim
against an employer. Moreover, allowing such damages adheres to the
analytical framework of Townsend.297 Third, the Supreme Court has
slowly eroded the Miles uniformity principle and its preemptive effect.
1. The Jones Act Expanded the Remedies Available to Seamen
Congress did not intend to limit a seaman’s remedies with the passage
of the Jones Act. By its very text, the Jones Act gives a seaman the ability
to “elect” to bring a claim against the employer, “thereby completing the
295. See supra Part I.C.2.c.–d.
296. See supra Part I.C.2.c.–d.
297. See supra Part I.C.2.d.
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trilogy of heightened legal protections (unavailable to other maritime
workers) that seamen receive because of their exposure to the ‘perils of
the sea.’”298 Furthermore, the Jones Act “was remedial, for the benefit[s]
and protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admiralty. Its
purpose was to enlarge that protection, not to narrow it.”299 The Act simply
created a statutory cause of action for negligence against the seaman’s
employer but did not disturb any preexisting available general maritime
law remedies.300 Therefore, nothing in the Jones Act precludes the award of
punitive damages against a non-employer third party not even contemplated
in the statute. Throughout the history of maritime law, courts emphasize the
need to protect seamen as the wards of admiralty.301 Reading an invisible
limitation into the Jones Act of these wards’ right to recover general
maritime law remedies against non-employer tortfeasors would undermine
the core principle of maritime law to protect its wards.
Returning to the opening hypothetical, Gilligan should be able to
recover the same damages as the passengers aboard the M.V. Minnow.
Facing the same dangers as the passengers entitles him to the same
protections afforded to the non-seafarers. Moreover, arguably in the
maritime products liability context, a seaman should be given the ability to
recover punitive damages from a maritime manufacturer presumably
endangering countless other seamen. The Jones Act should not shield the
maritime manufacturer’s liability from damages caused by its willful and
wanton misconduct. By enacting the Jones Act, Congress intended to
expand the protections available to seamen;302 to interpret it as limiting
those protections would thwart Congress’s intentions.

298. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354 (1995) (citing G. GILMORE &
C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-21, pp. 328–29 (2d ed. 1975)).
299. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936). See Atl. Sounding Co.
v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 417 (2009).
300. See Townsend, 557 U.S. at 417.
301. See Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. 611, 620 (1827) (Johnson, J., concurring)
(referring for the first time to seamen as the “wards of . . . Admiralty”). Many later
cases followed this terminology. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 286
(1897); Wilder v. Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co., 211 U.S. 239, 247 (1908); Warner
v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 162 (1934) (“In respect of dealings of that order, the
maritime law by inveterate tradition has made the ordinary seaman a member of
a favored class. He is a ‘ward of the admiralty,’ often ignorant and helpless, and
so in need of protection against himself as well as others.”).
302. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 415–16.
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2. Unrelated Claims and Parties: Distinguishing Miles and
Effectively Overruling Scarborough
Using the analytical framework of Townsend, a claim against a thirdparty non-employer does not directly invoke the Jones Act.303 Moreover,
a claim against a third-party non-employer predated the federal statute,
and the Jones Act did not displace any preexisting remedies.
In Townsend, the Court noted that a seaman’s claim for maintenance
and cure dates back to almost the 13th century, and the Jones Act in no
way undermines the seaman’s claim.304 Similar to a claim for maintenance
and cure, a seaman’s right to sue a third party for a maritime tort exists as
a separate and independent claim from a Jones Act negligence cause of
action.305 Congress has never addressed the liability of a third-party
tortfeasor; therefore, a claim by a seaman against a third-party non-employer
does not “sail in [the] occupied waters” of Congressional preemption.306
Similar to maintenance and cure, general maritime law recognized the
tort of negligence for nearly two centuries. As early as 1859, the Supreme
Court articulated, “[n]or is the definition of the term ‘torts’ . . . confined
to wrongs or injuries committed by direct force. It also includes wrongs
suffered in consequence of the negligence or malfeasance of others, where
the remedy at common law is by an action on the case.”307 A seaman long
ago acquired the right to sue in maritime tort for damages.308 As stated in
The Osceola, the only limitation imposed by general maritime law on a
seaman was the inability to sue the members of the crew or the master of the
vessel for their negligence.309 The Jones Act removed this jurisprudential
303. See supra Part I.C.2.d.
304. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 417–18.
305. Bridges v. Penrod Drilling Co., 740 F.2d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1984).
306. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 36 (1990).
307. Phila., Wilmington & Balt. R.R. Co. v. Phila. & Havre de Grace Steam
Towboat Co., 64 U.S. 209, 21516 (1859).
308. See, e.g., Pettingill v. Dinsmore, 19 F. Cas. 392 (D. Me. 1843) (allowing
a seaman to recover damages for an assault and battery on the high seas); Allen
v. Hallet, 1 F. Cas. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1849) (awarding damages to a seaman for
improper imprisonment during the course of the ship’s voyage); Sheridan v.
Furbur, 21 F. Cas. 1266, 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1834) (“In the numerous cases brought
into this court [by seamen] on claims for wages and for damages for personal torts
. . . .”); Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626, 630 (1881) (“Nor is the term ‘tort,’
when used in reference to admiralty jurisdiction, confined to wrong or injuries
committed by direct force, but it includes wrongs suffered in consequence of the
negligence of malfeasance of others, where the remedy at common-law is by an
action on the case.”).
309. The Osceola, 180 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
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bar but in no way affected remedies available under general maritime law
against non-employers. The Act “did not eliminate pre-existing remedies
available to seamen for the separate common-law cause of action based on
a seaman’s right [to sue in maritime tort].”310
Although the Supreme Court in Miles limited recovery against the
employer in an unseaworthiness action arising under general maritime law
because of its relationship to the Jones Act, the reasoning of Miles does not
extend to a claim by a seaman against a third-party non-employer.311 Claims
by seamen against third-party tortfeasors are completely separate and apart
from their remedy under the Jones Act. A claim for unseaworthiness could
be brought against a vessel owner who also happens to be the Jones Act
employer.312 A claim against a true third-party non-employer, however,
does not involve or relate to the Jones Act employer.
Unlike the no-fault claim for unseaworthiness in Miles and a negligence
claim under the Jones Act, a claim for punitive damages against a third-party
tortfeasor requires a much higher showing of misconduct313—typically
willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the safety of others.314 The
cause of action against the third-party non-employer could arise from
different tortious acts with completely different levels of culpability.
Gilligan’s Jones Act employer could be found negligent simply for failing
to check the hydraulic fluid in the steering system whereas the manufacturer
recklessly allowed its product to be used with no warning to its consumers.
Therefore, it would be consistent with general maritime law to impose
a more “expansive remed[y]”315 in which the claim requires a significantly
higher showing of fault than Congress dictated against a separately culpable
third party. A claim for punitive damages against a third party that does not
implicate the Jones Act or even arise from the same misconduct should not
be precluded simply because of its distant relation to the Jones Act.
Moreover, the Jones Act “evinces no general hostility to recovery under
maritime law.”316 The law should not protect the more culpable third party
under the guise of “uniformity” in seaman recovery.
In its pursuit of this uniformity, the Fifth Circuit in Scarborough
incorrectly limited the recovery of a Jones Act seaman in a claim that has
310. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 415–16 (2009).
311. See Miles, 498 U.S. 19.
312. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. Maritime Law: Miles,
Baker, and Townsend, supra note 72, at 464 (referring to unseaworthiness and Jones
Act negligence as being “Siamese twins” because of their close connection).
313. See id. at 472.
314. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008).
315. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 32.
316. Id. at 29.
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no bearing on the Jones Act.317 Moreover, since Scarborough was decided,
the Supreme Court in Townsend specifically rejected the reasoning of
Guevara, upon which Scarborough relied, and has undermined the Miles
uniformity principle that Guevara’s reasoning unnecessarily expanded.318
The Jones Act simply created a statutory claim for negligence against the
Jones Act employer, but it did not destroy “pre-existing remedies available
to seaman for the separate common-law cause of action based on a
seaman’s absolute right to maintenance and cure.”319
Although the identity of the Jones Act employer sometimes seems
unclear due to the business entity’s structure,320 this uncertainty should not
defeat an award of punitive damages against a third-party non-employer.
Maritime law adopts the Highlander principle,321 according to which “[the
Supreme Court has] no doubt that under the Jones Act only one person,
firm, or corporation can be sued as employer.”322 If a seaman works for a
subsidiary or shell entity of the Jones Act employer, then that cause of action
presents a different issue. If the third-party non-employer can be classified
as a completely independent entity to the Jones Act employer, such punitive
damages should be available against this separate, yet culpable, entity. This
distinction necessarily requires a factual determination of the true identity
of the Jones Act employer.
3. The Court Has Slowly Eroded the Miles Uniformity Principle’s
Effect
Turning to the Miles uniformity principle, as Judge Fallon pointed out
in Collins, “it should make no difference whether the Plaintiff was a seaman,
a longshoreman or a passenger.”323 Because no applicable congressional
statute exists regarding the liability of a third party or non-employer, there

317. Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL
5254710 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015).
318. See supra Part II.B.2.
319. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 415–16 (2009) (emphasis
added).
320. See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 602
F.2d 474, 476 (2d Cir. 1979) (discussing the common practice in the shipping
industry of corporations owned by the same persons and run by the same officers).
321. HIGHLANDER (Canon Films 1986). The Highlander principle derives
from the iconic tag line of this movie, “There can be only one.” Id.
322. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 791 (1949). See
Johnson v. GlobalSantaFe Offshore Serv., Inc., 799 F.3d 317, 325 (5th. Cir. 2015).
323. Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., No. 14-1900, 2015 WL
5254710, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2015).
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is no need to treat an employer under the Jones Act and a non-employer in
a uniform fashion. Similar to Gilligan’s situation, all plaintiffs in that cause
of action should receive the same recovery from the manufacturer
predicated on the same tort principles of general maritime law.
Moreover, the Court has eroded what Miles referred to as the
uniformity principle. The Court first eroded this principle in Exxon v.
Baker, in which the Supreme Court quoted United States v. Texas, stating,
“to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to
the question addressed by the common law.”324 The Jones Act neither
speaks “directly” about non-employers nor “directly” about barring
punitive damages. Second, in Townsend, the Court declared that the quest
for uniformity in maritime law does not require limiting damages to the
“lowest common denominator” set by Congress for other separate causes
of action.325 Limiting a seaman’s recovery in a separate cause of action
against a third-party tortfeasor would unnecessarily bring his recovery to
the lowest common denominator.
Furthermore, in Yamaha Motor Corp. U.S.A. v. Calhoun, the Court
noted that Congress may have prescribed a comprehensive tort recovery
regime with some claims, but as to others, Congress has not prescribed
remedies.326 Therefore, although DOHSA prescribed the remedies available
for a wrongful death on the high seas, no congressional statute preempted or
determined the recovery of damages in a state wrongful death action that did
not occur on the high seas.327 With the absence of Congressional mandate,
the Yamaha Court could determine such recovery. Congress has not created
a comprehensive statutory scheme regarding the liability of third-party nonemployers or the categories of recoverable damages in cases arising under
general maritime law. With this congressional silence, these areas of
maritime law have not been preempted, and therefore, a seaman should be
able to recover punitive damages from a third-party non-employer.

324. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (citing Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (emphasis added)).
325. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009); see also The
Explorer, 20 F. 135, 138 (C.C.E.D. La. 1884) (“Even in cases of marine torts . . .
courts of admiralty are in the habit of giving or withholding damages upon
enlarged principles of justice and equity, and have not circumscribed themselves
within the positive boundaries of mere municipal law.”).
326. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215 (1996)
(holding that damage limitations prescribed by DOHSA did not apply to a death
occurring within the territorial waters of the state, and, therefore, state damage
remedies would apply).
327. Id.
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CONCLUSION
No one can avoid the inevitable changing tides of maritime legal
concepts. Current Supreme Court precedent permits a Jones Act seaman to
recover punitive damages for an employer’s willful, wanton, and arbitrary
withholding of general maritime law maintenance and cure benefits.328
Although the Jones Act may preclude the recovery of punitive damages
against the Jones Act employer for negligence and wrongful death, this
congressional statute places no limitation on the damages recoverable in an
ancient general maritime law tort cause of action against non-employer
third-party tortfeasors. The third party should not be shielded from punitive
damages under general maritime law simply because Congress may have
protected the Jones Act employer from those types of damages.
The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc should address the issue of third-party
liability for general maritime law punitive damages and overrule or clarify
Scarborough.329 A seaman should be able to recover general maritime law
punitive damages for the tortious activity of a third-party non-employer.
No statutory maritime law precludes the recovery of such damages for this
wholly distinct and historically available cause of action. To disallow the
recovery of punitive damages to a seaman would constitute a grave
injustice and limit the protections of those who face the perils of the sea.
The wards of admiralty should be given the same protection as a nonseafarer, and Gilligan should recover the same damages as his fellow
castaways.
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